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Carreras, Dobson and colleagues have studied empirical data on the sizes of the blackouts in real
grids and modeled them by computer simulations using the direct current approximation. They
have found that the resulting blackout sizes are distributed as a power law and suggested that this
is because the grids are driven to the self-organized critical state. In contrast, more recent studies
found that the distribution of cascades is bimodal as in a first order phase transition, resulting in
either a very small blackout or a very large blackout, engulfing a finite fraction of the system. Here
we reconcile the two approaches and investigate how the distribution of the blackouts changes with
model parameters, including the tolerance criteria and the dynamic rules of failure of the overloaded
lines during the cascade. In addition, we study the same problem for the Motter and Lai model and
find similar results, suggesting that the physical laws of flow on the network are not as important
as network topology, overload conditions, and dynamic rules of failure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cascading failures in the power grids continue to hap-
pen in spite of efforts to make power grids more re-
silient [1–3]. The standard criterion of resiliency is the
N − 1 criterion [4]: the grid must safely operate in the
event of the failure of any single line. Carreras et al.
have studied empirical data on the sizes of the blackouts
in real grids [5] and modeled them by computer simula-
tions using the direct current (DC) approximation [6–8].
They have found that the resulting blackout sizes are dis-
tributed as a power law and suggested that this is because
the grids are driven to the self-organized critical (SOC)
state [9–11]. In their model, they assume that at any
stage of the cascade, one of the lines with loads exceed-
ing the maximum values imposed by the N − 1 condi-
tion fails and immediately all the currents in the grids
are redistributed adjusting to the new network topol-
ogy. The motivation for this “one-by-one” failure rule
of the cascade propagation comes from investigation of
real blackouts. It is documented [1, 12] that the failures
of overloaded lines do not happen instantaneously but
require a certain period of time, during which overloaded
lines undergo heating expansion. When the expanded
line touches the ground or foliage, the current in the line
dramatically increases and the line breaks, after which
the current in other lines changes almost instantaneously,
so that if the current in a previously overloaded line re-
duces to normal, that line’s length reduces and it may
eventually survive the cascade of failures. Ren et al. [4]
suggested that the power grid is driven to the SOC state
by recursive upgrading of the power grid with constantly
growing power demand, applying the N − 1 condition,
or by upgrading lines involved in the recent cascade of
failures. They simulated this model of self-organization
and found that the system converges in the infinite time
limit to a steady state caracterized by an exponential
distribution of the blackout sizes, while the SOC mod-
els typically display power law distribution of avalanche
lengths associated with a second-order critical point as
in percolation theory [18, 19, 37].
In contrast, more recent studies [13, 14] have suggested
that the distribution of cascades is bimodal, with a first
order phase transition, resulting in either a very small
blackout or a very large one. In all these studies, the
cascades of failures were started by a random failure of a
single line, and the currents were computed from a given
distribution of loads and generators using the DC current
approximation. The difference between these studies was
that the maximal loads in [13] were computed not by us-
ing N−1 criterion, but by a uniform tolerance algorithm
as in [15, 16] and that the overloaded lines during each
stage of the cascade were eliminated all-at-once [17–19],
not one-by-one.
The difference in the outcome between the “one-by-
one” rule and the “all-at-once” rule suggests that the
cascade propagation in the overload models inherently
depends on the dynamics of the cascade, which makes
these models very different from the simple topological
models of cascading failures in which the final outcome
depends only the network topology and initial failures
and is the same for any sequence of removals of the un-
functional elements [21].
Here we reconcile the two approaches and show that
the power law distribution of cascades emerges for high
protection level, and also in cases where the network
topology is close the percolation point. We also show
that the “one-by-one” removal rule significantly reduces
the sizes of large blackouts and their probabilities, re-
placing the bimodal distribution of blackouts by an ap-
proximate power-law for intermediate protection levels
when the “all-at-once” rule still leads to a bimodal dis-
tribution. We show that these features are held for both
the DC model of a power grid and for the much simpler
Motter and Lai model, suggesting that the exact physical
2laws of flow on the network (Kirchhoff’s laws vs. mini-
mal path rule) are not as relevant as the protection level,
network topology and the cascade dynamics rules.
II. POWER-LAW VERSUS BIMODAL
DISTRIBUTIONS
In this section we will review the conditions under
which the distribution of cascade sizes in overload mod-
els are power law or bimodal, and compare these overload
models with the topological models [22–29], in which the
outcome of the cascade depends only on the initial topol-
ogy of the network and location of the initially damaged
elements. Topological or overload models can be investi-
gated for two different classes of initial attacks.
In the first well studied class [26, 27, 30, 32, 33], the
cascade is started by a massive attack, after which only
a fraction p of elements survive. For this class, an in-
teresting problem is to study the behavior of the order
parameter S(p), the fraction of the surviving nodes at the
end of the cascade, as a function of the initially surviv-
ing elements p. Many topological and overload models
exhibit a first order phase transition at p = pt, at which
the order parameter S(p) exhibits a step discontinuity,
or a second order transition at p = pc, at which the order
parameter is continuous but its derivative with respect to
p exhibits a step discontinuity. For finite systems, near
p = pt the distribution of the order parameter becomes
bimodal, and the transition point pc is defined as the
point at which the population of the two peaks is equal.
For the second order transition the distribution of the or-
der parameter is always unimodal. For some topological
and overload models, the line of the first order transi-
tions, pt, in a plane of two parameters may transform
into the line of second order phase transitions, pc at a
certain value of the second parameter [27, 30, 31, 33].
In the second class of initial attacks, such as in the
above mentioned discussion of power grids, the cascade
is started by the failure of a single element. Here, it is
informative to study the distribution of the “blackout”
sizes, i.e., the number of nodes that failed during the
cascade and how such a probability distribution depends
on the model parameters. This type of initial attacks
may exist in two flavors.
In the first flavor, the system first undergoes a cas-
cade of failures caused by a massive initial attack with
p > pt and the order parameter stabilizes at S(p). This
is analogous to the first class of initial attacks. After-
wards, the avalanche is started by the removal of one ad-
ditional element. In the well-studied topological models,
it is known [32, 33], that
S(p)− S(pt + 0) ∼ (p− pt)
1/2, (1)
where S(pt + 0) is the limit of S(p) for p → pt above
the step discontinuity. Because in the topological models
the order of removal elements does not play any role, the
removal of one node after the system is stabilized at p is
identical to the initial removal of pN +1 nodes, where N
is the total number of elements in the system. In either
situation, the average avalanche size under this initial
conditions is s = N [S(p + 1/N) − S(p)] ≈ ∂S(p)/∂p ∼
(p−pt)
−1/2. Hence, the avalanche size diverges above the
transition point pt, with the divergence characterized by
the critical exponent γ = −1/2. In network theory this
transition is called a hybrid transition, but in fact this be-
havior is completely equivalent to the mean field behavior
near the spinodal of the first order phase transition, such
as the behavior of the isothermal compressibility near
the spinodal of the gas-liquid phase transition. This fol-
lows from the fact that the isothermal compressibility is
equivalent to the susceptibility in the Ising model, which
in turn is equivalent to the average cluster size at the
percolation transition. The divergence takes place only
for p > pt, while for p < pt the avalanches remain of finite
size or do not exist at all, since S(p) = 0 for p < pt. For
p→ pt + 0, the distribution of the avalanche sizes devel-
ops a power law behavior with an exponential cutoff S∗:
P (s) ∼ s−τ exp(−S/S∗) with the mean field exponent
τ = 3/2 [32, 33], and S∗ ∼ (p − pt)
−1/σ with σ = −1;
they, together with γ = −1/2, satisfy a usual percolation
scaling relation γ = (2 − τ)/σ, but with different γ and
σ than in the percolation theory [36, 37].
For the second flavor of the one-element-failure initial
attack, which is typical for most power grid simulations,
the system exists in a state characterized by some set of
parameters, but the parameter p describing the size of
the initial attack is not applicable at all. In this case,
both in topological and overload models, the cascading
failures evolve as a branching process in which the failure
of one element leads to the failure of b elements, which
depend on the failed element in the topological models,
or get overloaded due to the removal of the failed ele-
ment in the overload models. The critical point of the
simplest branching process with a fixed distribution of
the branching factor P (b) is defined by 〈b〉 = 1 [34]. For
the mean-field variant of the fixed distribution model,
the distribution of the avalanche sizes is a power law
with an exponential cutoff P (s) ∼ s−τ exp(−s/s∗), where
s∗ ∼ (〈b〉 − 1)−1/σ. Here σ = 1/2 and τ = 3/2 are the
critical exponents [36, 37]. These in turn give the values
of the two other critical exponents γ = (2−τ)/σ = 1 and
β = (τ −1)/σ = 1, where γ governs the divergence of the
average finite avalanche size for 〈b〉 → 1 and β governs
the probability of an infinite avalanche (i.e., failed net-
work) for 〈b〉 > 1. These infinite avalanches, which are
approximated in the finite system by finite avalanches
that distintegrate the network, and whose size fluctuates
around µN , form the second peak of the bimodal dis-
tribution. The finite avalanches, which do not scale as
a finite fraction of the network, form a first peak of the
distributions, which is separated from the second peak
by a huge gap because there are no avalanches of size
s, such that s∗ << s << µ (Fig. 1). Thus, this simple
branching process model predicts the existence of regimes
with bimodal (〈b〉 > 1) and power-law distributions with
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FIG. 1. Cumulative distributions of the avalanche sizes
in the failure branching process with the Poisson branch-
ing degree distributions, with the average branching factors
〈b〉 = 0.9, 0.95, 1, 1.05, 1.1 for finite system of N = 100000 and
N = 200000 nodes. One can see that the bimodal distribution
of avalanches, characterized by a wide horizontal plateau of
the cumulative distribution, emerges for 〈b〉 > 1. For 〈b〉 < 1,
the distribution has an exponential cutoff. Exactly at the
critical point 〈b〉 = 1, the distribution is a power law with a
finite-system cutoff. The power law region with the exponent
τ − 1 = 0.5 increases with the size of the system.
exponential cutoff (〈b〉 ≤ 1), depending on the parame-
ters of the model. Carreras et al. conjecture [5] that the
power grid is a SOC system which somehow drives itself
to the critical point of this branching process, at which
the distribution of blackouts is a power law. It is not
clear how this SOC process works. It may be created by
the long-term effect of the application of the N − 1 cri-
terion [4] or, more likely, by some empirical compromise
between safety and price of keeping 〈b〉 small: Electric
companies want to eliminate large catastrophic blackouts
which exist for 〈b〉 > 1, but trying to save money on the
infrastructure, are willing to accept finite blackouts. Ob-
viously, this compromise is achieved for 〈b〉 = 1 − ǫ. In
the following sections we will check this failure-branching
process model by computer simulations.
III. SIMULATIONS OF THE POWER GRIDS
In order to verify that the N − 1 condition in addition
to the one-by-one failure rule is responsible for the emer-
gence of the power-law distributions of the blackouts, we
perform the DC simulations of several grid topologies
including a simplified model of the US Western Inter-
connect (USWI) [38], Learning Based Synthetic Power
Grid (LBSPG) [39, 40], Degree and Distance attachment
model (DADA) [13], and two models of artificial topolo-
gies: a random 2-d graph with given maximal line length
(RML) and random regular 2-d graph with given degree
of a node (RR). In both RML and RR grids there are
np generator nodes which produce power, nc loads which
consume power and nt transmitter nodes, which do not
produce or consume power but redistribute the flow be-
tween several power lines. We assume that all genera-
tors or loads produce or consume equal power. We use
the model, setting np = nc = 1000 and nt = 8000. All
N = np+nc+nt nodes are randomly placed on a square of
edge L and periodic boundaries. In the RR model, each
node is connected to its k nearest neighbors. In order to
make sure that each line connected to exactly k nodes,
we make a list of all nearest neighbor pairs and start to
select pairs from this list in ascending order of length, cre-
ating a link between them if both of the nodes in the pair
have less than k links. At the end of the process, the ma-
jority of nodes have k links with a few exceptions which
have only k − 1 links. In the RML model, each node is
surrounded with a circle of radius r = L
√
〈k〉/(πN) and
is connected to all the nodes within this circle. Since
the nodes are randomly distributed geographically, the
degree distribution of nodes becomes a Poisson distribu-
tion with average degree 〈k〉. We used k = 4 for RR and
〈k〉 = 5.0 for RML. If the grid does not form a single
connected cluster, we discard all the nodes which do not
belong to the largest connected cluster.
To implement the N−1 condition for all of our models,
we proceed as follows: Assuming that the grid contains
nL links, we obtain the current in a given link ij after the
removal of each one of the other (nL−1) links, and we find
the maximal current I∗ij through that link ij obtained
over the set of those (nL− 1) currents. We use this value
I∗ij as the maximal possible load that the link ij may sus-
tain. We start each simulation with the removal of a ran-
dom pair of links, iaja and ibjb, and recompute the cur-
rents in all remining links, I1ij . If in some links I
1
ij > I
∗
ij ,
we find the link with maximal overload I1ij/I
∗
ij , remove it
and find the new currents I2ij (one-by-one update rule).
We continue this process until, after removal of n links,
for all remaining links, Inij ≤ I
∗
ij . If at a certain stage,
the grid splits into several disconnected clusters, we ap-
ply the power production-consumption equalization for
each cluster using the minimal production-consumption
rule described in [13] We compute the blackout size as a
fraction of the consumed power lost in the cascade.
In order to carefully assess the importance of the N−1
condition and the update rule, we also perform simula-
tions for networks with uniform tolerance protection in
which I∗ij = (α + 1)Ii,j , where Ii,j is the current in line
i, j in the unperturbed network. Thus, for each network
model, we study four cases: N − 1 condition together
with one-by-one or all-at-once update rules, and uniform
tolerance together with one-by-one or all-at-once update
rules.
First, we consider the N − 1 condition, along with the
one-by-one rule. Implementing the N − 1 condition sig-
nificantly improves the robustness of the grid, as com-
pared to the uniform tolerance model with small α. This
4is not surprising because for all four models of the power
grid, the effective tolerance of line ij under the N − 1
rule, αij ≡ I
∗
ij/Iij − 1 (where Iij is the initial current in
the line ij) is a wide distribution with almost 5% of lines
having αi,j > 1. Thus, the fraction of runs that result
in any additional line overload is about 0.03; for most
pairs of initially attacked lines, no further lines are over-
loaded. For the tolerance model with a uniform α, this
level of protection is achieved only for α > 1. Thus, im-
plementation of the N − 1 condition and the one-by-one
rule reduces the sizes of blackouts and create many small
cascades that end after few failures [Fig. 2(a,b)]. For
all four models of the power grid we observe the emer-
gence of the approximate power law part in the distribu-
tion of the size of the small cascades. However, for each
model except RML with 〈k〉 = 5.0 (which is close to the
RML percolation threshold for 〈k〉 = 4.5), in addition to
small blackouts characterized by an approximate power
law distribution, we still find some large blackouts with
a significant fraction of power loss. Note also that the
power-law part of this distribution is still practically ab-
sent in the case for the USWI and LBSPG models. Thus,
the entire distribution remains bimodal with two peaks
for small and large cascades and practically no cascades
of an intermediate size. This absence can be observed
on the cumulative distribution graph as a large plateau
[Fig. 2(a)]. The value of the exponent characterizing the
power law part of the cumulative distribution of small
cascades varies for different models but remains in the
range between 0 and 1.
We next consider the N − 1 condition, but with the
all-at-once update rule. The power law part of the black-
out distribution disappears [Fig. 2(c)]. The distribution
becomes strictly bimodal even for the case of RML model
with 〈k〉 = 5.0, for which the N − 1 condition together
with the one-by-one rule produce a power-law distribu-
tion of blackouts. Additionally, large blackouts become
much larger with the all-at-once rule than with the one-
by-one rule; the system is more prone to failure.
Next, we systematically explore how the N − 1 condi-
tion, uniform tolerance, and different dynamic rules af-
fect the blackout distributions in the USWI and LBSPG
models (Fig. 3). First of all, we see that the behaviors
of the two models are very similar. This is not surpris-
ing because the LBSPG has been designed to reproduce
the topological features of USWI. Fig. 3(a) shows that
the N − 1 condition with all-at-once rule or with one-
by-one rule leads to bimodal distributions. Although the
chance to obtain a cascade of any length bigger than one
is very small, once a cascade starts the chance of obtain-
ing a blackout of a significant fraction of the system size
is quite large. The difference between one-by-one and all-
at-once rules is that for the latter, the typical maximal
blackout corresponds to approximately 40% of all lines,
while for the former it is only 6% of all the lines.
If, instead, we return to the uniform tolerance con-
dition of [13], and still use the all-at-once rule for line
removal as in [13], the shape of the blackout distribution
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FIG. 2. Cumulative distributions of blackout sizes, measured
as a function of the fraction of the consumed power lost in
the blackout for different grid topologies described in the text,
with the DC current approximation and the N − 1 condition
implemented. (a) One-by-one update rule. All distributions
remain bimodal except for the RML model with 〈k〉 = 5.0.
(b) The same as (b) in double logarithm scale. A power-law
distribution with τ −1 = 0.5 emerges for the case of the RML
model. (c) All-at-once update rule. All distributions remain
bimodal.
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FIG. 3. Cumulative distributions of blackout sizes, measured
as a function of the fraction of failed lines for the USWI and
LBSPG models. (a) Both models for the N−1 condition with
all-at-once and one-by-one update rules. (b) USWI model,
and (c) LBSPG for different uniform tolerance α and both
update rules. One can see that for sufficiently large values
of the tolerance, α > 1.2, the distribution becomes approxi-
mately power-law with large values of τ − 1 ≥ 1. The imple-
mentation of the one-by-one update rule with the uniform tol-
erance model shows that the power law distribution emerges
for smaller value of the tolerance, α = 0.8.
depends only on the tolerance level α [Fig. 3(b),(c)]. As
in [13], we start a cascade with an initial removal of a
single line. In agreement with the original results of [13],
the bimodality disappears for α > 1 and a power-law
distribution appears instead. The introduction of the
one-by-one update rule together with the uniform
tolerance condition shows the emergence of the power
law for lower values of the tolerance, α = 0.8, and a
significant reduction of the sizes of the largest blackouts
(Fig. 3(b)).
All in all, our simulations suggest that neither theN−1
condition nor the one-by-one update rule are necessary
nor sufficient for the emergence of the power-law distri-
bution of the blackouts. The important condition is an
overall level of line protection which can be efficiently
achieved by increasing enough the uniform tolerance α.
The N−1 condition alone does not eliminate large catas-
trophic blackouts in the bimodal distribution; instead it
significantly reduces the chance of any blackout caused by
initial removal of two lines. The one-by-one update rule
also reduces the sizes of largest blackouts and removes the
bimodality at smaller values of α, but is not strictly nec-
essary. Another important aspect is the network topol-
ogy. For sparse homogeneous networks whose failures
are close to the percolation threshold such as our RML
model, the power-law distribution of blackouts emerges
for smaller levels of protection, while for the other models
similar failure rules still yield a bimodal distribution.
IV. BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY
OVERLOADS WITH THE N − 1 CONDITION
As one can see, the models of the power grids we study
are relatively complex and have many different parame-
ters, the role of which is difficult to clarify. Therefore,
it is desirable to study a simpler model of overloads
in which the role of each parameter becomes clear. It
is also interesting to see if the emergence of the power
law distribution is a universal phenomenon for different
overload models. A good candidate for such a model
is the betweenness centrality model, which displays a
clear first order transition for the all-at-once removal rule
and uniform tolerance condition employed by Motter and
Lai [15]. However, we can expect that, similarly to the
power grid models, the implementation of the N − 1
condition and one-by-one removal rule in the between-
ness centrality model will also lead to the emergence of
a power-law distribution of the blackout sizes. Testing
of this hypothesis will allow us to better understand the
general mechanism of the emergence of the power law dis-
tribution of the sizes of blackouts in the overload models.
We build the beweenness centrality model as in [30].
Namely, we create a randomly connected graph with a
given degree distribution P (k) and compute the shortest
paths between each pair of nodes. The length of each
edge is assumed to be equal to 1 + ǫ, where ǫ is a nor-
mally distributed random variable with a small standard
deviation σǫ ≪ 1. This precaution is taken in order to
make sure that each pair of nodes ij has a unique shortest
path connecting them. The betweenness centrality b(k)
of each node k is computed as the number of all short-
est paths ij passing through node k, such that k 6= i ,
k 6= j. The N−1 condition in the betweenness-centrality
model should be understood in the following way: If any
6node i is deleted, the rest of the nodes remain connected
and the betweenness centrality of each remaining node
j, bi(j) does not exceed its maximal possible load b
∗(j).
Thus
b∗(j) = max
i6=j
bi(j) (2)
and the original graph must be biconnected. Note that
in the original Motter and Lai model with a uniform tol-
erance α > 0,
b∗(j) = (1 + α)b(j), (3)
where b(j) is the initial betweenness of node j in a com-
pletely intact network.
To implement this model, we first construct a randomly
connected graph of N nodes with a given degree distri-
bution P (k) by the Molloy-Read algorithm [41] and find
its largest biconnected component with Nb nodes using
the Hopcroft-Tarjan algorithm [42]. After that, we com-
pute the betweenness centrality of each node and repeat
Nb simulations with each node removed in turn to find
b∗(i) for each node. To find the distribution of cascades
of failures we remove a pair of random nodes and find the
nodes i with overloads z = b(i)/b∗(i) > 1. In the first
model of all-at-once removal, at each stage of the cas-
cade we remove all the nodes with overloads, recompute
the betweenness centrality of the remaining nodes and
repeat this process until no overloaded nodes are left. In
the second model of one-by-one removal, at each stage of
the cascades we remove only one of the overloaded nodes,
the one with the largest overload z, we then recompute
all the centralities, and repeat this process until no over-
loaded nodes are left. We study several cases of Erdo¨s
Re´nyi (ER) networks with different average degrees 〈k〉
and different number of nodes in the biconnected com-
ponent Nb. The size of the blackout is computed as the
fraction of removed nodes at the end of the cascade. We
also study the distribution of the number of nodes dis-
connected from the giant component.
Again, the N − 1 condition is not necessary for the
emergence of the power-law distribution of the cascades
in the Motter and Lai model. For example, if we take an
ER network with 〈k〉 = 1.5 and 0.1 < α < 0.2, we see
the transition from a bimodal distribution of the cascades
to a power-law distribution with an exponential cut-off
[Fig. 4(a)] as α increases. This is somewhat similar to the
effect observed for large α and small fraction p of nodes
that survive the initial attack in Ref. [30], where the bi-
modal distribution of the cascades ceases to exist. In
fact, small p effectively brings the network to the perco-
lation transition equivalent to small 〈k〉 → 1. Replacing
the all-at-once update rule by the one-by-one rule shifts
the transition from bimodal to a power-law distribution
at a smaller α [Fig. 4(b)], but both behaviors can still be
seen.
Simultaneous application of the N − 1 condition and
the one-by-one removal rule leads to the emergence of
the power-law distribution of the small cascades for small
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FIG. 4. (a) Cumulative distributions of blackout sizes, mea-
sured as the fraction of failed nodes in the Motter and
Lai model with different values of tolerance α and all-at-
once update rule. Black lines indicate graphs for values of
α = 0.02, 0.03, ...0.19. (b) Comparison of all-at-once and one-
by-one update rules for selected values of the tolerance. One
can see the emergence of the power law distribution in the
one-by-one removal case for much smaller values of tolerance
.
values of 〈k〉 (Fig. 5). For small 〈k〉, close to the perco-
lation threshold and small system sizes, the bimodality
of the blackout distribution disappears and the distri-
bution of blackouts becomes an approximate power law
with an exponential cutoff. As the size of the network
increases, the exponential cutoff disappears and the bi-
modality emerges again, with a peak for large blackouts
emerging. The beginning of the cumulative distribution
for all values of 〈k〉 and all sizes of the system exhibits the
same slope of −1/2, which is the mean-field value for the
SOC models [11]. For large 〈k〉, we observe only a small
fraction of blackouts distributed as a power law, while
the entire distribution remains bimodal; many networks
completely disintegrate. However, the increase of the sys-
tem size leads to the relative increase of the range of the
power law behavior. As the system size increases, we ob-
7for all values of 〈k〉 studied (Fig. 5). For small system
sizes, we observe a smaller initial negative slope (> −1/2)
and a sharp exponential cutoff. For larger system sizes
the slope increases to almost exactly −1/2, and the cutoff
shifts to larger values. For even larger sizes, the slope of
the initial part of the cumulative distribution increases
even further (< −1/2) but an inflection point appears in
the distribution, indicating the start of bimodality. As
the system size continues to increase the negative initial
slope continues to grow and the plateau region of the
cumulative distribution separating large blackouts from
small becomes longer and longer.
Interestingly, the behavior of the cumulative distribu-
tion of the blackouts for fixed 〈k〉 and increasing system
size is analogous to the behavior of the cumulative distri-
bution of the sizes of avalanches in the failure-branching
process on a system of fixed size when the branching fac-
tor 〈b〉 increases (Fig. 1). The cumulative distribution for
the avalanche distribution for 〈b〉 < 1 has a negative slope
smaller than τ − 1, and has a strong exponential cutoff.
As 〈b〉 increases, the slope increases and the exponential
cutoff shifts to larger values. When 〈b〉 approaches the
critical point, 〈b〉 = 1, the distribution develops an in-
flection point and a plateau that separates finite clusters
and the giant component. For 〈b〉 > 1, the initial slope
becomes larger than τ . In contrast to this, the behavior
of the blackout size distribution, for fixed size, as 〈k〉 ap-
proaches the critical value of the percolation transition
is analogous to increase of the system size in the distri-
bution of avalanches in the failure-branching process. As
〈k〉 → 1, the range over which we see the power behavior
with the mean field critical exponent τ = −0.5 increases.
Similarly, in a failure-branching process, the length of
the failure avalanche increases, even as its behavior and
exponent do not change.
As we saw, Carreras et al. [5] suggested that the power
law distribution of the blackouts is due to the long-
term evolution of the power-grids, driven by simultane-
ous growth of power consumption and upgrades of the
most vulnerable power lines [4]. However the propaga-
tion of cascades in a power grid of fixed size, when apply-
ing the N − 1 condition and the one-by-one update rule,
resembles SOC models, in which the most vulnerable ele-
ment is removed, and the vulnerability of other elements
changes instantaneously. To test this hypothesis, we per-
form a detailed study of the propagation of the cascade
in a biconnected component with N − 1 protection and
one-by-one update rule. One can see that during the cas-
cade the number of overloaded nodes fluctuate near zero
and never gets too large. In the mean-field variant of
SOC, the simplest of the SOC models [11], an array of N
real numbers,“fitnesses”, uniformly distributed between
0 and 1 is created. At each time step the smallest ele-
ment in the array and m randomly selected elements are
replaced by new values selected from the same uniform
distribution. As a result, after certain transition period,
the majority of elements have fitness above the critical
value fc = 1/(m + 1). The number of active elements
1 10 100 1000 10000
number of deleted nodes
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
P(
N d
>
x)
<k>=1.2 N=1000000
<k>=1.2 N=500000
<k>=1.2 N=400000
<k>=1.2 N=250000
<k>=4.0 N=10000
<k>=4.0 N=2000
<k>=1.5 N=100000
<k>=1.5 N=50000
<k>=1.5 N=40000
<k>=1.5 N=25000
<k>=1.5 N=12500
slope -1/2
FIG. 5. Cumulative distributions of blackout sizes, measured
as the fraction of failed nodes in the Motter and Lai model
with N−1 conditions and one-by one update rule for different
system sizes and different average degrees.
(elements with fitness less than a certain value f) per-
forms a random walk, and an avalanche ends when the
number of active elements returns to zero. When the
value of the selected fitness is equal to the critical value
f = fc, the random walk is unbiased, and the distribu-
tion of avalanche lengths coincides with the distribution
of returns to the origin of a random walker, which has
the exponent τ − 1 = 1/2 [35]. The number of active
elements for f = fc scales as N
df with df = 1/2. We see
[Fig. 6(a)] that in our model the behavior of the number
of overloaded nodes is similar to the behavior of the ran-
dom walk, which is consistent with the observed value
of τ ≈ 0.5. However, the DFA analysis [43, 44] of the
number of overloaded nodes during the cascade gives the
value of the Hurst exponent ≈ 0.1, which is much smaller
than the exponent for the uncorrelated random walk of
the mean-field SOC model. The number of overloaded
nodes scales as lnNb, or a very small power law. In our
model, the fitness of a node is its relative overload zi, and
the level of zi is not arbitrary as in the SOC models, but
is defined initially as zi = 1. When, after implementing
the N − 1 condition, we initially remove two nodes, the
system is placed near the critical point, because the num-
ber of overloaded nodes after the initial attack is usually
very small. However, this is done not automatically, as
in the SOC models, but by implementing the N − 1 con-
dition and the initial removal of two nodes. This action
results in the overload of very few nodes, because the
combined effect of the removal of two nodes rarely cre-
ates overloads larger than the maximal overloads created
by the separate removal of each of these nodes. This is
due to a long-tail effect; the removal of a single node will
greatly increase the load of a few nodes, but barely af-
fect most of the other nodes. However, when more nodes
are removed in the process of the cascade, the topology
8of the network changes and the system is slowly driven
away from the critical point.
We also see that the disintegration of the biconnected
component is approximately a random removal of nodes
due to subsequent overloads, with slight preference for
the removal of nodes with k = 2 over nodes with k = 3.
At the beginning of the cascade the removals take place
in the biconnected component, reducing it by the length
of a chain of nodes with k = 2 in between a pair of nodes
with k ≥ 3. Each such removal only reduces the size
of the giant component by one. But as more and more
nodes are removed, further removals may happen in the
singly connected part of the network. Figure 6 (b) shows
the size of the biconnected component to which the re-
moved node belongs as function of the cascade stage. If it
belongs to a singly connected part of the remaining net-
work, we plot zero instead of the size of the biconnected
component. When a node that is part of the singly con-
nected part fails, the network separates into disconnected
parts and the size of the giant component drops signif-
icantly. At the beginning, the smaller part is usually a
dangling end and the drop in size is relatively small, but
eventually, two approximately equal parts get separated.
At this point the betweenness of all nodes decreases dra-
matically (approximately by factor of 4) and the cascade
ends. Thus, although the cascade dynamics has some
similarities with SOC, (at each time step the node with
the largest overload is removed and the overloads of the
rest of the nodes are changed), our model does not stay
at the critical state but moves away from it.
The comparison between a mean-field variant of SOC
and our network overload dynamics is also instructive to
help us understand when a bimodal distribution occurs
and when a power law distribution does. A power law
distribution, such as in a branching process, occurs when
there is a series of failures, each of which has a chance of
precipitating b = 1 additional failures. Since there is the
possibility, at each stage of the cascade, of no new nodes
failing and the process stopping, the chance that exactly
one more node will fail decreases exponentially. At the
critical point, the cascade begins with b = 1, but as the
network disintegrates b changes. The all-at-once update
rule causes the network to disintegrate in fewer steps,
since multiple nodes are removed at each step, and thus
b increases during the cascade of failures without many
chances for the cascade to end prematurely. Thus, after
a few steps b > 1, and the process will not stop itself with
an intermediate level of destruction. However, there are
two different conditions that will prevent b from increas-
ing drastically as the network begins to disintegrate. One
is a high level of overall protection, whether through the
implementation of the N − 1 condition or through a high
uniform α. High overall protection means that minor
network destruction will not cause widespread overload
and drive b away from one; only severe network destruc-
tion can do that. Thus, the overload process has a chance
to stop spontaneously before it reaches that stage. The
other conditions is if the network is near the percolation
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FIG. 6. (a) Dependence of the number of overloaded nodes
as function of the cascade step for the Motter and Lai model
for 〈k〉 = 1.2 and N = 500000, with the N − 1 condition
and one-by-one update rule. (b) Dependence of the size of
the biconnected component and the giant component as a
function of the cascade step.
point, where the failure of a single node has a high chance
of separating a small, but sizable component from the
network. This will drastically decrease the overall load
and thus stabilize the network, arresting the cascade of
failures [30]. In cnclusion, a one-by-one update rule and a
high overall protection both contribute to the formation
of a power law. The effect of the system size discussed
above can also be understood in light of the compari-
son to a branching process. The larger the system, the
more nodes (as an absolute number, not a fraction) fail
following the initial attack. Thus, the chance that none
of the overloaded nodes will cause another node to over-
load (i.e. a spontaneous end to the cascade) becomes
increasingly unlikely as the number of overloaded nodes
increases, even if b remains close to one for many steps
of the cascade. Thus, the chance that the cascade of
failures will end with an intermediate amount of dam-
age becomes more unlikely when the size of the original
system increases.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have shown that the DC model of the power grid
has remarkable similarities to the Motter and Lai model
of betweenness centrality, suggesting that the exact phys-
ical laws governing the flux do not play as big a role as
the network topology and the dynamics of the cascade
propagation. We have shown that both overload mod-
els have similarities and differences with the topological
models with dependency links [27]. In the topological
models the outcome of the cascade depends only on the
topology of the network and the location of the initial
9damage, while in the overload models the outcome sig-
nificantly depends on the dynamics of the cascade, which
itself depends on the order of removal of overloaded el-
ements and the relative speed of failure of overloaded
elements and redistribution of flux after elements fail-
ure. In general, if the failure is slow compared to the
redistribution of flux (one-by-one removal rule) the cas-
cades become smaller and the distribution of blackouts
becomes unimodal, while for fast failures of overloaded
elements (the all-at-once removal rule) the distribution
of blackouts is bimodal. The shape of the distribution of
the blackout sizes becomes approximately a power law as
the topology of the network approaches the percolation
transition for large level of protection. In summary, the
general picture of the behavior of the overload models is
consistent with the simple model of the failure branching
process. For large protection levels (small 〈b〉) the distri-
bution of blackout sizes is a power law with exponential
cutoff, while for low protection levels (large 〈b〉) the dis-
tribution of blackout sizes is bimodal, with a fraction of
large avalanches which decreases as the protection level
increases.
The empirical observation of the power law distribu-
tion of the blackout sizes in real power grids indicates
that these grids are near the critical point of the cor-
respondent failure branching process. However, this is
unlikely to be caused by a SOC mechanism in which the
model is driven to the critical point by a certain dynamic
rule. One hypothesis would be that it is the N − 1 cri-
terion and the one-by-one update rule that brings the
grid to the SOC state. However, we observe here that
these two conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient
for the existence of a power law distribution of black-
out sizes. Most likely the power grids are brought to the
vicinity of the critical point by a risk-price compromise,
in which the utilities, with the firm goal of avoiding the
catastrophic blackouts that engulf a significant fraction
of the entire system, increase the level of protection up
to the critical point of the branching process 〈b〉 < 1;
but in order to minimize costs under this condition, al-
low 〈b〉 to be as close as possible to the critical point
from below, so that limited but occasionally very large
blackouts are still possible. It is still desirable to develop
a model of long time evolution of power grids similar
to [4], which reproduces the power-law distribution of
avalanches. The observation of power law distribution
of the blackouts in the sparse networks close to the per-
colation point also emphasizes the role of islanding for
preventing large blackouts.
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